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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff & Respondent
vs.
JEAN ASAY,
Defendant & Appellant
vs.
DONNA NELSON & HARPER R. NELSON,
Third Party Defendants.

CASE NO. 87-0161CA

APPELLANTS BRIEF

Appeal from a Judgment from the Fifth
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department, the Honorable
LeRoy h. Griffiths, Judge

GLEN J. ELLIS
ELLIS & ELLIS, ATTORNEYS
60 E. 100 S. Suite 102
PO pox 1097
Proyo, Utah, 84603
Attorney for Appellants
DAVID MCPHIE
3450 S. Highland Drive,
Suite 301,
SLC, Utah 84106
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent
Michael A. Katz
311 S State Suite 320
SLC, Utah 84111
,», T^ «*w^ ff^^K *~*^k £""** * *"""**^t

Attorney for Third Party Defendants.
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COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216
SINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
attorney for Plaintiff
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106
relephone: 484-7632
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION, a Utah corporation,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A. McPHIE
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES

V.

)

Civil No. 85CVM-06470

JEAN ASAY,

)

Judge Griffiths

Defendant-

)

Third Party Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

DONNA NELSON and HARPER R.
NELSON,
Third Party Defendants.

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
•
)

ss

COMES NOW David A. McPhie, attorney for the plaintiff in
the above captioned matter, and being first duly sworn and upon
oath, deposes and states that:
1.

In

connection

with

the

above

captioned

case, I

rendered services to the LDS Church Employees Credit Union on the
dates indicated, and billed them the amounts of money for the
services

indicated

attached hereto.

as

being

rendered

listed

on

Schedule A

2.

In that all of the work performed, or costs incurred,

as described in the entries marked with a H*ff were performed
directly in pursuance of the plaintiffs complaint against the
defendant,

and

not

in

investigation

or defense

against the

counterclaim of the defendant*
3.

The work performed, and the monies billed to the

plaintiff for the services marked with a "#" of Schedule A, were
rendered for purposes of defending against the counterclaim of
the defendant•
4.

Costs incurred in this case are in the amounts of

$12.50 for filing, $6,75 for service of process and $280.20 in
deposition costs.

The deposisions taken pursued both plaintiffs

complaint and defendants counterclaim.
5.
include

The

attorneys

defending

fees

against

the

indicated

in

defendants

this
and

affidavit

third

party

defendants objections to the proposed order of the plaintiff
prepared subsequent to trial, and indicated with a "+".
6.

This is the end of my affidavit.

DATED this /rday

of March, 1987.

^> A/y*t*U
David A. McPhie
sworn

t o jbefore

me on„ t h i s
-SA

//?

NOTARY PUBLIt in and for
Salt Lake/County

&
//

of

Schedule A
* = plaintiffs complaint
# = defendants counterclaim
+ = plaintiffs defense against objections to proposed order
1985
Amount S
9/25
Dictation of summons and complaint

150.00*

9/25
Review of drafts of summons and complaint

15.00*

9/25
Filing fee

12.50*

10/85
Service of process
11/13
Dictation of reply to counterclaim
11/14
Preparation of reply to counterclaim

6.75*
30.00#
6.00#

11/14
Review of reply to counterclaim

22.50#

1986
1/13
Dictation of notice of deposition
2/12
Preparation for deposition, travel, conference
2/13
Deposition
2/86 Deposition costs

Dictation of motion for summary judgment,
affidavit of Tom Capece, notice of hearing

18.00*
18.00#
81.00*
81.00#
67.50*
67.50#
140.10*
140.10#

150.uO*

/27
eview/revision of motion, affidavit
/4
ravel for signature on affidavit

18.OCA

/16
sview of motion to amend counteclaim, counterlaim, affidavit of Paul Clint

40.00#

/24
Durt appeaarance on MSJ, their motion to amend
'24
Lctation of order denying SJ, request for trial
'6
.ctation of motion to dismiss counterclaim,
>.t up depositions, interrogatories, requests
>r the production of documents, schedule conf.

100.00*
20.0G#

125,00*

80.00#
200.00*

ctation of letter to Trujillo

40.00*

8
eparation of motion to dismiss, calls to
lsons, notices of deposition

16.00#

12
eting with CU on case, notes

56. 00**

14
aparation for deposition, Clint, Nelsons
14
Icing of depositions

station of letter to atty Garett for Nelsons

>earance at motion to dismiss

60.00*
20.00#
60.00*
60.00#
32.00#

80.00#

sting with CU persons on answers to interroga-

tes
tation of responses to discovery

128.00#
80.00#

13
4. Grant Defendant attorney fees against Third Party
Defendants for a Bad Faith refusal to admit their debt when it
was due, and an asserted defense without merit, which they
abandoned on the day of trial.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of August, 1987.

NOTICE OF MAILING
Mailed the Original and five copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, SLC, Utah, 84102; and two
copies each to David A. McPhie, attorney for Plaintiff, 3450 S.
Highland Drive, Suite 301, SLC, Utah 84106 and Michael A. Katz,
attorney for Third Party Defendants, 311 South State Street,
Suite 320, SKC, Utah 84111, postage prepaid this 25th of August,
1987,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
* * *

LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION, a U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Plaintiff,

C i v i l No. 85CVM-6470

vs.

Deposition

JEAN ASAY,

of:

JEAN ASAY

Defendant.
* *

*

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of February,
1986, the deposition of JEAN ASAY, produced as a witness by
and on behalf of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action
in the above-named Court, was taken before Cecllee Gruendell,
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for
the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:22 o'clock
a.m. of said day, at the offices of David A. McPhie, 56 East
Broadway, Suite 600, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
That the said deposition was taken pursuant to
Notice.
•

* *

I put t h i s d e l i c a t e l y , d i d n ' t t e l l t h e t r u t h o n o n e l o a n , s o
it was d e n i e d him, a n d h e was a p p l y i n g f o r a n o t h e r
31

through a n o t h e r

loan

company.

*

Q

To p a y f o r t h e

house?

5

A

Yes, t h e w h o l e h o u s e .

In order to qualify

6

t h a t loan, h e n e e d e d some s e c u r i t y , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e

7

money i n a s a v i n g s

8
9
10
11

Q

You mean h e n e e d e d t o b e a b l e t o show t h a t h e

T h a t h e h a d some money i n a bank, y e s .

So we had

the c a s h money.
Q

when y o u s a y "we/' TVC?

13

A

TVC h a d t h e c a s h money.

Credit Union w h e r e Mr. H a r p e r

We w e n t down t o LDS

banked.

15

Q

Mr. H a r p e r ?

16

A

E x c u s e me, we a l w a y s c a l l e d him H a r p e r .

17

Mr.

Harper N e l s o n was h i s name.

18

Q

When y o u s a y we w e n t down, who w e n t down?

19

A

Linda Thayne and myself.

20

that worked

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

Took the money, and put it in Harper's, Mr.

23
24
25

had

somewhere?

12

14

been

account.

some money i n a b a n k
A

for

She was a n o t h e r

person

there.

Nelson's savings, account, which was his wife's, Dona Nelson.
Q

Okay.
MR. TRUJILLO:

Her name a t t h a t t i m e w a s ?

7

THE WITNESS:

Dona Brighton.

Q

(BY MR. McPHIE)

Before s h e married Mr. Nelson?

A

Nelson, I b e l i e v e .

Q

Go ahead.

A

Put t h e money i n h i s a c c o u n t and borrowed i t back

Q

Well, when you s a y "borrowed i t back out/ 1 took

What happened n e x t ?

out..

out a loan a t t h e c r e d i t union.

You d i d n ' t t a k e t h o s e v e r y

dollars out of t h a t account?
A

Right.

So we had, i n a s e n s e , a secured loan, was

my understanding, t h a t t h e l o a n was secured, and that when
the loan closed on t h e i r h o u s e , t h e money would be paid back.
1/ me, Jean Asay p e r s o n a l l y , would be r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e
interest.

I t was a v e r b a l agreement between Mr. Nelson and

myself t h a t he would t a k e c a r e of t h a t .

But t h a t f s n e i t h e r

here nor t h e r e .
Q

When you s a y i t was a v e r b a l agreement?

A

J u s t t o l d me i t wouldn f t h a v e amounted to, I

believe $100.
Q

So if I u n d e r s t a n d i t , y o u r p l a n was, TVC would go

put the money in Nelson's account, and i t ended up, Mrs.
Nelson's account, and offer t h a t a s s e c u r i t y on a loan t h a t
you would get from t h e c r e d i t jmnion, you p e r s o n a l l y would g e t
from the c r e d i t union?
A

Uh-huh.

I s a t t h e r e i n Mrs. S a r t o r i f s

office,

8
however you say it, and asked her numerable times, "Are you
sure this money is secure?

This is a lot of money for me.

Are you sure that nobody can touch this money without my
signature?"

She said yes. Two or three times I asked her

with Miss Thayne sitting there, "Are you sure?"

She said,

"No one can touch that money without your signature." I
said, "Okay."
Q

Without your signature?

A

Uh-huh.

Then I understood that it would be mine

and Dona's that it would require, and so I felt pretty
comfortable that the money, when the time came, would be
there to pay the loan off.
Q

Okay.

Let me take you back to the loan situation

where you were applying for the loan. So you're saying that
the $5,000 that went into the Nelson account was TVC money?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

When you went in to borrow the $5,000 from the

credit union, what you essentially told the loan officer,
whoever you dealt with, was, "If you'll loan me $5,000, me
personally, I will secure payment of my $5,000 loan by
pledging the money that's in Nelson's share account"?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Yes.

Q

Okay, was s h e t h e r e ?

Mrs. Nelson, was s h e willing t o do t h a t ?

ORIGINAL
1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

3
4

*

LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNIO N, a Utah corporation,

*

*

)
)

5

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 85 06470

6

Deposition of:

vs.
7

PAUL FRANKLIN CLINT

JEAN ASAY
8

Defendant.
9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Wednesday, the 14th day of

12

May, 1986, commencing at the hour of 2:40 p.m., the

13

deposition of PAUL FRANKLIN CLINT, produced as a witness

14

at the instance of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action

15

now pending in the above-named Court, was taken before

16

JILL DUNFORD, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary

17

Public, in and for the State of Utah, at the offices of

18

David A. McPhie, 56 East Broadway, Suite 600, Salt Lake

19

City, Utah; and

20
21

That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice.
* * *

22
23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH S4UH

9
A

No.

Q

Was a deal ever made between the Nelsons and

TVC concerning the building of a home on that lot?
A

Yes.

Q

What was the nature of the deal?

A

We acted as go-between.

Q

When you say we, you mean TVC?

A

Between them and the builders, coordinated

the efforts to acquire the lot, worked out a process on
a plan whereby they could acquire equity using access to
some exchange privileges they had as a result of their
employment.
Q

Who was the builder?

A

Hang on—they say you block out unpleasant

memories.
Q

Do you not presently remember the name of the

builder?
A

I'm sorry, I don't.

I'll think of it in a minute.

Q

Mr. Nelson has testified that as the time came

to anticipate the home being completed and it became
time to obtain long-time financing for the home, it became
apparent that he would need to show that he had enough
money in the bank to cover closing costs in order to obtain
the financing, and that they did not have enough money to
demonstrate to a lender that he could cover the closing
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

10
costs, and that it was agreed between himself and TVC
through you that monies could be put in his account at the
LDS Church Employees Credit Union for purposes of it
appearing that he had enough money.

Do you recall any

such agreement with him or anything like that?
A

You bet.

Q

Tell me in a nutshell, was my statement fairly

accurate or would you like to explain that?

Is it different

than what I stated?
A

A little bit different.

Q

Give me your version, would you.

A

The purpose was t o —

Q

The purpose of what?

A

The purpose of the process that we went through

was to create funds where none existed.

TVC went through

situations where, from time to time when we received
payments, that we had the use of for a few days and then
had to pay out to someone else.
So we developed a process whereby we would deposit
the money in the Nelsons' account.

We arranged an agreement

with the LDS Credit Union to use his account as collateral
for someone else other than the Nelsons to borrow the
money back using the account as collateral.

In essence,

to create funds where none had existed prior.

The money

was not real, it was not really there, because the loan
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

11
and the deposit canceled each other out.
Q

You didn't tell me anything about your agreement

with Mr. Nelson.
A

The agreement was to effect just exactly what

I described.
Q

So $5,000 was deposited by TVC into Mr. Nelson's

savings account?
A

Yes.

Q

This was an account that you and she had gone

in together to the credit union earlier and opened; is
that correct?
A

I am under the impression that it was an account

that they had already had, it was an existing account.
Q

Well, not to challenge you, but just to refresh

your memory if it's true, Mrs. Nelson testified 10 minutes
ago that the actual sequence was that you and she went in,
opened up an account in her name, and she put $25 in it.
A

Okay.

Q

And your testimony now is that TVC through you

later put $5,000 into that savings account in Mrs. Nelson's
name.
A

That's right.

Q

And your testimony is that your purpose in

doing that was to accomplish two things:

One,

have sufficient

monies in the Nelsons' account that they could qualify for
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101

12
the long--term financing for their home so that it
wou Id appear i that they could cover closing costs, and
at the same time present to the credit union sufficient
security that they would lend back the $5,000 to another
ind ividual.
A

Yes •

Q

And did, in fact, Jean Asay borrow back the

$5, 000?
A

Yes •

Q

In 1aer own name?

A

Yes •

Q

Did you have any agreement with Mr. Nelson or

Mrs . Nelson that you or TVC would, in fact, pay the closing
costs on the ]home?
A

Yes

Q

Did there come a time when closing on the home

was scheduled and TVC or you personally did not have enough
funds to pay •the closing costs?
A

Yes

Q

Did you at that time make an agreement with

Mr. Nelson that he could, because you did not then or TVC
did not then ]have the money to cover the closing costs,
go and get $4 ,288.50 out of Mrs. Nelson's account, the
ver y accoun t the
$5,000 had been placed in and come
back to close and use that to cover the closing costs?
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

Michael A. Katz, #3817
GARRETT AND STURDY
ATTORNEYS FOR

Third Party

Defendants

311 SOUTH STATE STREET
SUITE 3 2 0
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
T E L E P H O N E (801) 3 3 2 - 2 7 0 7

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

L.D.S. CHURCH EMPLOYEES
CREDIT UNION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

OFFER OF JUDGMENT

vs .
JEAN ASAY,
Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs .
Civil No. 85CVM-06470
DONNA NELSON and
HARPER R. NELSON,
Third Partv Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 68(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Third Party Defendants Donna Nelson and Harper R. Nelson
make an offer of judgment in favor of Jean Asay in the sum
of $711.50.
DATED this 26th day of January, 1987.
GARRETT AND STURDY

Michael A. Katz

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January, 1987,
I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Offer of Judgment to:
Mr. Jose Luis Trujillo
Attorney at Law
967 East 4800 South, Suite 3A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Mr. David A. McPhie
Attorney at Law
56 E. Broadway, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Michael A. Katz, #3817
GARRETT AND STURDY
ATTORNEYS FOR
Third

Party

Defendants

311 SOUTH STATE S T R E E T
SUITE 3 2 0
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE

1801)332-2707

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT

L.D.S. CHURCH EMPLOYEES
CREDIT UNION, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff,

OBJECTIONS TO
PROPOSED JUDGMENT

vs .
JEAN ASAY,
Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs .
Civil No. 85CVM-06A70
DONNA NELSON and
HARPER R. NELSON,
Third Party Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice for the Circuit
Courts, State of Utah, Third Party Defendants Donna Nelson
and Harper R. Nelson hereby object to the proposed Order and
Judgment

submitted

by

Plaintiff

L.D.S. Church Employees

Credit Union as to the specific item of attorney's fees as
set forth therein.

This objection is based upon the pleadings and papers
on file with the Court, the trial of this matter on January
27, 1987, and the argument set forth below.
ARGUMENT
Paragraph E of the Judgment sets forth the Plaintiff's
claimed

entitlement

$2,500.00.

to

attorney's

fees

in

the

sum

of

Those fees were awarded by the Court in its

verbal ruling following trial.

However, such fees must be

rejected or, at the minimum, reduced substantially as a
matter of law.
Utah follows the well-established majority rule that
attorney's fees can only be recovered if provided for by
statute or a contract existing between the parties,

B & R

Supply Co. vs. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216
(1972).

On our facts, there existed a Note running to

Plaintiff executed by Jean Asay whereby Defendant agreed to
pay those attorney's fees incurred in collection.

Admitted-

ly, Plaintiff did file suit on the Note in these proceedings
premised upon Defendant's failure to pay.

It is noted that

no demand for payment was made upon Harper and Donna Nelson
prior to instituting litigation.

But, if an award of attor-

ney's fees is based upon a contract, as here, the award must
be strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Any services rendered which fall outside of collecting on
the

Note

must

be

disallowed.

-2-

With

that

substantial

limitation in mind, one should review the allegations raised
in this lawsuit.
The majority of Plaintiff's counsel's time devoted to
this

case was

incurred

Counterclaim for fraud.
conducted.

Pursuant

in defending

against Defendant's

This includes most of the discovery
to

the

rules

of

apportionment,

announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Farm Production
Credit Ass'n vs. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah, 1981), those fees
must be disallowed.

A copy of that important decision is

attached for the Court's consideration.
In Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n vs. Cox, plaintiff
sued on a promissory note in the precise manner as occurred
in the case at bar.

In response, the defendant/borrower

counterclaimed for an alleged mishandling of the loan as did
Jean Asay in our instance.

Relying on the earlier case of

Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d
Supreme Court held:

"...

168

(Utah, 1977), the Utah

the plaintiff was not entitled

to reimbursement for fees he had incurred in defending a
counterclaim."

627 P.2d at 66.

The Court then went further and found that where the
Court is left without a means to determine that portion of
fees attributed to prosecuting the complaint, as contrasted
with that portion spent in defending the counterclaim, the
entire award of attorney's costs must fall.
<r

~

~~~

'

Unless counsel

*

"""•"

for the credit union made the necessary distinction, the
$2,500.00 claim must clearly fail in accord with the cited
Utah cases.
-^-

Apart from the need to apportion, other limitations are
put upon Plaintiff's rights to recover attorney's fees which
apply on our facts.

An appellate court will only uphold

such an award where the amount is reasonable.
Court's
factor

consideration
is

recovered.

the

of

reasonableness,

relationship

of

the

fee

And in the

the
to

principal
the

amount

Turtle Management, Inc. vs. Haggis Management,

645 P.2d

667

(Utah, 1982).

recovered

is

approximately

Where
1/3

of

the principal
the

amount

attorney's

fees

sought, the Court must substantially reduce the fees or the
award

becomes

indicates

how

unreasonable.
Plaintiff

On

spent

our

facts,

this

also

substantially

more

time

defending against Jean Asayfs Counterclaim in relation to
time spent recovering the Promissory Note indebtedness.
It may be argued

that the Nelsons, as Third Party

Defendants, have no right to object to the Credit Union's
claims.

So long

as those

fees

are ultimately

assessed

against the Third Party Defendants as apparently happened
here, their objection is well noted.

At the commencement of

trial on January 27, 1987, the objection of the Nelsons to
any assessment of attorney's fees was made before the Court
and opposing counsel.
In view of Plaintiff's failure to apportion his fees as
strictly required by Utah law, and the underlying unreasonableness of those fees, Third Party Defendants Harper and
Donna Nelson object to any award thereof.

-4-

DATED th i s H

Ti

day of February, 1987.
GARRETT AND STURDY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

^j~

day °f February,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objections to
Proposed Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
David A. McPhie, Esq.
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
3450 So. Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Mr. Jose Luis Truiillo
Attorney at Law
967 East 4800 South, Suite 3A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

W/fa

-5-

>A^L

CERTIFIED COPY
1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
-oOo-

3
4

LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION,

5
6
7

Plaintiff,
vs.
JEAN ASAY,

)
)
)

Case No. 85 CVM 6470

)

HEARING

)

e

Defendant.

9

)
-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of March, 1987,

12

the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

13

Honorable L. H. Griffiths, sitting as Judge in the above-named

14

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

15

proceedings were had.
-oOo-

16
17

APPEARANCES:

18

For the Plaintiff:

MR. DAVID A. McPHIE
Attorney at Law
3450 South Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106

For the Defendant:
22

MR. MICHAEL A. KATZ
Attorney at Law
311 South State, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

23

MR. J. L. TRUJILLO

19
20
21

24
25
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2
3

THE COURT:

This is the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court,

4

the Murray Department.

Jfm Judge L.H. Griffiths.

5

19th day of March, 1987.

This is the

It f s time for the matter of LDS Church Employees Credit

6
7

Union vs. Jean Asay, defendant and third-party plaintiff, vs.

8

Donna and Harper R. Nelson, third-party defendants, Case No.

9

85 Civil 6470.

1°
11
12

Now, we had a trial and there was a judgment entered
in this matter.

I'm not sure just what this hearing is today.

MR. McPHIE:

For the record, David McPhie, for the

13

plaintiff.

14

a proposed order within the time allowed, I believe, by law, I

15

did receive an objection to my proposed order from Mr. Katz,

16

representing the third-party defendant, and then subsequently I

17

received an objection to my proposed order, essentially joining in

16

the motion of Mr. Katz by the defendant.

19

We did have a trial in this matter and I did send in

I—then we were notified by the Court of this date and

20

the purpose of this hearing is to resolve questions as to which

21

order should be entered and if no appropriate order is before the

22

Court, what an appropriate order should contain.

The objections

23 I of Mr. Katz and the defendant, to the best of my knowledge, are
24

that the attorney's fees awarded were excessive and that they

25

did not—for two reasons.

One, that they're just excessive

ASSOC! \Ti:i) PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

to trial, to add up the time that I was in this case.

2 I that I was in it 18, 19, 20 hours.
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
u

12
13
14

She told me

I came in and testified about

that and said that I antici—that that didn't include time I'd
I spent preparing and actual trial time that day and so my testimony
was what it was and the Court made its order.
Because of the memorandum of points and authorities
that Mr. Katz filed, and we agree with this point, it became
clear to me that I had to separate out time soent defending
I against the counterclaim.

So, I asked my secretary to actually

pull the time slips themselves, which I had not seen prior to
j coming to Court.

And we made, from the actual time slips, an

affidavit which I have submitted to the Court and which I have
submitted to Mr. Katz, but he only got it yesterday, and which I
submitted to Jean Asay's lawyer, but I don't know if he's got it,
where I've got all the time and all the services listed and I

15
have the services that were directly in pursuit of the complaint
16
makred with an asterisk.

I have the services that were directly

17
resol—or directly involved with defending against the counter18
claim marked with a pound sign, and I took the billings that
19
involved deposition, where we inquired as to both the plaintiff's
20
cause of action and the anticipated counterclaim and I split the
21
costs—-I split the billings between counterclaim and plaintiff's
22
23

cause equally.
There's also in this affidavit three items that are mark*

?4
w.ii. iH.iih.-i .in asterisk nor a pound sign but are marked with a pi
ASSOCIATKI) PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

2

THE COURT:

Well, I—I don't think that there's

anything to--

3

MR. McPHIE:

I will say this for Mr. Katz's position.

4

J know that he was offering the money through the thing, clear

5

back in the fall of 1986, because Mr. Trujillo, the defendant's

6

counsel, was calling me and saying, if you will settle for the

7

amount that he has agreed to pay, that is Nelson to Asay, we will

8

pass it through to you, and I said, we will not settle because of

9

the fees.

And I did make an error in my testimony to you.

I

10

said 1 hadn't seen Mr. Ellis until the day of trial.

11

Mr. Ellis in the down—in the Salt Lake Department of the Circuit

12

Court a few days before trial, at which time I indicated that the

13

matter wasn't settling for the offer of the Nelsons to the Asays

14

because of the fees of the plaintiff.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

I did see

Well, I guess if we leave it up to

16

human, we can complicate just about anything to the point that

17

it's really difficult to follow where equity lies in certain

18

things.

19

Procedure, and they're laid out so that everything should work

20

along orderly.

21

attorney fees are—should be allowed, and then we can add all of

22

the different types of peripheral things that in effect affect

23

all of these rules and substantive laws.

24
25

You can talk about procedure and the Rules of Civil

You have substantive laws which regards to when

When we had this lawsuit, it was apparent to myself,
as the Judge, as I ruled on it after hearing the evidence, that
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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9

1

Jean Asay owed some money to the credit union.

2

already stated to me at the beginning of the trial, through Mr,

3

Katz, that they owed Jean Asay.

4

it, and Mr. Katz left.

5

The Nelsons had

They said that, and I accepted

we had a difficult case from the standpoint that we,

6

the parties w e r e — f e l t very strongly about their points.

We had

7

testimony, it wasn't simple testimony, even though you're talking

8

about a si'.pie note, there were several of the witnesses who,

9

particularly as I remember, Mr. Clint, who in effect

is—several

10

times in that trial, I had to caution him that he wasn't really a

11

party to the action, and he was trying to make statements like a

12

party to the action.

13

tell him that he w a s — h e was out of order, that he wasn't a party

14

to the action, he wasn't Jean Asay and h i s — t h e attorney for Jean

15

Asay would have to be heard.

16

In fact, right at the beginning, I had to

I didn't know why, what the circumstances were right at

17

the beginning, I thought it was kind of strange for Mr. Clint to

18

be attempting to speak on behalf of Jean Asay, and then I found,

19

after the testimony came in, it to be apparent that Jean Asay

20

didn't appear, that Jean Asay was, in effect, a front for Mr.

21

Clint.

22

secretary.

23

her name, but she was doing it more as a — e i t h e r as a friend or

24

as an employee of him.

25

name, I have no way of knowing, and I guess there's a good reason,

She was in fact, as I remember the testimony, his
That, for some reason, the two notes were taken out in

And why he didn't take it out in his own

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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1

but that be--it wasn't important to me after awhile.

2

Jean Asay, from the standpoint that she didn't show up,

3

apparently had been assured by someone, that no matter what

4

happened, she was—judgment or no judgment, she wasn't going to

5

be really hurt, because if she was, I guess I'd—at least as far

6

as if I was her, I'd have been here; but she apparently had been

7

assured by somebody that you won't need to come because we're

8

talking about, you know, nearly a thousand dollars, if you take

9

just the basic amount that was owed, plus interest and the Court

1°

costs.

11

And now, it wasn't into this case very long that I

12

could see that whatever the principal amount was involved, the

13

attorney's fees was going to be another matter.

14

case that was a year-and-a-half old, that had a lot of hours in

15

it.

16

where we have a case that after it's—everything is said and done

17

in it, that you have an attorney fee that's say, three times the

18

amount of the note, the principal that the party sued on.

19

Here we had a

And I'm not—and as I say, I'm well aware of this problem,

I can remember the discussion with a Supreme Court

20

Justice about this.

H e — w e were talking about being on the

21

bench, it's not a new subject, we hear it at the Bar bulletins,

22

how can we hold down the cost of suits, this particular case that

23

I just spoke to the Justice, he had on his desk, and he had to

24

decide, had nothing to do with this matter, but it was similar

25

in that he had a judgment for one of the parties in the neighborho
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
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CONCLUSION:
This is a simple matter, in which the Defendant, Jean
Asay

was

Nelsons

put
to

into

honor

financial
their

peril

committment

because

she

trusted

the

to

off

a

she

pay

loan

obtained thru her employer for the Nelsons' benefit.
defaulted, the Credit Union found

When they

it more to their benefit to

sue Mrs. Asay, than to pursue the Nelsons1 whose overdraft of a
different account cause the shortage in the first instance; the
Credit

Union

made

that

election

because

they

had

a

written

promise to pay attorney fees. They never attempted in any way to
collect the money from the Nelsons.
Not content to stick an innocent person with attorney
fees,

the Credit

Union

attorney

made

claim

for

all

the

fees

expended by him in the case, not making any effort in the trial
to apportion the fees. Apparently being of the pursuasion that
he could collect fees not only in connection with the action on
the note, but also for work expended to defend the Credit Union
against

a Counterclaim,

the

only

testimony

on

fees

given

at

trial included both.
Following the trial the Court called a hearing on the
objections
revised

filed by Defendant

its

Judgment;

and Third

appeal

followed,

Party

Defendants, and

and

based

on

the

foregoing, this court should :
1. Grant Judgment to the Defendant on her Counterclaim
for bad faith on the part of the Credit Union in using her funds
to cover other persons debts.
2.

Stike

down

the

award

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

and

against Defendant, the debt sued upon being admittedly owed by
the Third Party Defendants, and not by Defendant.
3. Deny

Plaintiff

any

properly apportion his charges.

attorney

fees,

for

failure

to

II
savings account at the Credit Union.

Mrs. Asay, to accommodate

the Nelsons, borrowed

Credit Union

costs

of

$5,000.,

payments became
overdrafted

the

due.

their

from

Clint

Asay's

had

Contrary

checking

name,

put

savings account.

were

to

pay

the closing

the

loan

off

as

to that agreement, the Nelsons

account

at

the

Credit

Union.

The

to their committment to not invade the
into

covered

same

Nelsons

Credit Union, contrary
money

the

Savings,

Nelsons

1

under

overdraft

his
by

secretary

dipping

Jean

into

When the $5,000. note came due, the

the

savings

account was short by $877.03 of the amount necessary to pay the
note.

The Credit Union, knowing that the money was owed by the

Nelsons, and not by Mrs. Asay, still elected

to sue Mrs. Asay

because they had her signature on a note which provided for the
assessment of attorney fees, (see Transcript, Exhibit "E", p 29.)
Nelsons1

The

according

to

Plaintiff

counsel's

statements, could have settled the case at any time, by paying
the $877.03, but they would not and did not pay the money until
after the matter had been through court, and Mrs. Asay had been
stuck with their
filed

that

amount

of

bad bill. It was only after

counsel
their

foi

the

Nelsons

overdraft,

interest,

tendered
and

this appeal

was

payment

the

costs.

for

After

this

appeal was on file, the money was paid, and counsel for Nelsons
went

back

to

the

lower

court

Satisfaction of the Judgment.

and

obtained

That order

an

order

for

is in limbo, waiting

for resolution of the appeal.
The described

sequence

of events, plus

the fact

that

the Nelsons admitted liability, on the day of the trial, which
they did not even attend, indicates extreme bad faith on th^ir
part.

The looming question is, "Why did they not pay the money

when it was due, why did they intentionally and knowingly leave
the

innocent

Mrs. Asay

to

face

an

unnecessary

before they finally acknowledged their debt?"

legal

action

10

d. Apart from the need to apportion, our appellate
courts have refused to grant attorney fees which are
disproportionate to the amount sued for. (Turtle
Management Inc. vs Haggis Management, 645 P. 2d 667,
Utah 1982.) Any experienced lawyer knows that proving
a promissory note, where the existence of the note and
it's signature by defendant is admitted, is the
simplest type of legal action. Plaintiff's counsel,
having failed to present any apportionment during trial
pursuaded the court to accept an affidavit, (Exhibit
"F"), which accounts for $2096.85 in time for doing the
note foreclosure, and only $1,101.10 in time for
defending against the Counterclaim. A brief look at
the Exhibits attached as "A", "B", and " C shows that
the real thrust of all the discovery, and the major use
of lawyer time in this case was defense against the
Counterclaim. Since the Affidavit itself was not part
of the Trial, the Court, absent a motion to reopen to
receive additional evidence, could not rely on that
affidavit in awarding fees.
5. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO BAD FAITH ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS,
78-27-56 UCA was enacted by the Legislature in 1981 to
remedy situations where a party to an action does not act in
good faith, but makes the other party "go through the hoops"
unnecessarily.
In this case, the Third Party Defendants, the Nelsons,
in order to obtain a housing loan, entered into an agreement to
put money belonging to a fourth party, Mr. Clint, into their

9
the Court did sign.
He admits that an Objection to that
proposed Judgment was timely filedr (ignoring the fact that
defendant had also objected, see Transcript, Exhibit "E",p36),
and that the purpose of the Hearing was to resolve the issue
here on appeal; towit, whether the Court was free to award
attorney fees on a promissory note, when a large portion of the
attorney's time was spent on defending the plaintiff against a
Counterclaim*
Mr. Katz, attorney for Third Party Defendants submitted
in his Objection (Exhibit n D n ) such an excellently written
argument, that it is necessary here only to adopt that argument
in whole, by reference, and present only a capsule resume:
a. Attorney fees can only be awarded in Utah if there is
an underlying Statute or Contract, on which the suit is
successfully prosecuted, (quoting B & R Supply vs.
Bringhurst, 28 Ut 2nd 442, 503 P.2d 1216).
b. Any services to plaintiff by counsel, not lying
within the parameters of the suit for collection of
the note are not includeable. (Utah Farm Production
Credit Ass'n vs. Cox 627 P2d 62, (Ut 1981)).
The
doctrine of apportionment in Cox is derived from the
earlier case of Stubbs V. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168 (1977)
In Cox, the court held, "...the plaintiff was not
entitled to reimbursement for fees he had incurred in
defending a counterclaim." 627 P.2d at 66.
c.The Cox case decision goes further, and holds that
where the plaintiff's attorney does not apportion his
time, as between the complaint, and defense of the
counterclaim, the court is powerless to grant any fees.

8
paragraph b. of Rule 68, nor was it a tender of money
which may be accomplished under paragraph a. of Rule 68
up to the date of the trial.
b. An Offer of Judgment under paragraph 68b. requires a
minimum of 10 days before trial so that the other party
may either accept or reject the offer. Under the
circumstances, it was not a valid prefer , and entitled
the Third Party Defendants to no protection.
c. The Offer of Judgment, in order to be valid under
Rule 68b, must be at least as advantageous as the
ultimate judgment, including costs, or it gives not
protection to the offeror. In this case, the Judgment
rendered by the court was for more money ($877.03),
than the amount of the offer, ($711.50), so the offer
is not effective.
The offer is also silent with
respect to costs, the Judgment awarded costs of $194.
and interest of $272.
4. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFF, WHEN
THE EVIDENCE INCLUDED NO ATTEMPT TO APPORTION THE FEES.
Exhibit "C" attached is the amended Judgment signed by
Judge Griffiths after the March 18th hearing, the Transcript of
which is attached as Exhibit "En . The hearing was convened on
motion of the court, following the filing of Objections (Exhibit
W
D") by both Defendant and Third Party Defendants.
Exhibit "C", prepared by Plaintiff's Counsel, is
designated as a "Judgment", but essentially rehearses all of the
Findings of Fact, plus the action taken at the second Hearing,
plus the amended Judgment.
On page 3 of Exhibit "C", counsel admits that he
submitted a proposed order (meaning the first Judgment), which

7
indicates that the true facts were known by Mr. Clint, as well
as by Plaintiff's attorney. In the trial however, the Judge
took the rather peculiar position that because Clint arranged
for his secretary, Mrs. Asay to obtain the loan in her name,
that somehow that barred Clint from testifying about things
which he knew, because he was not a party, and the judge refused
to allow the man to testify!(see Transcript, p.30, Exhibit "E").
78-24-1 and 2, UCA provide that any person competent to
perceive is deemed competent to be a witness. There is no
requirement in the law that a person must be a party in order to
testify about facts within his knowledge. The judge went on to
draw some very strange conclusions, based on no evidence, that
because Jean Asay did not show up on the date of the trial, that
./someone , that no matter what happened, she was — judgment or
no judgment, she wasn't going to be really hurt.*/ (Transcript,
p. 31). As a matter of fact, Mrs. Asay did not appear because
she went to the wrong court building. The judge's bias is too
apparent to need comment. His prejudice against Paul Clint Left
a gap in the testimony such that the Judge dismissed defendants'
counterclaim, though the salient^ facts appear in the deposition,
which was published, and were well known to plaintiff and its
counsel, as appears in the depositions, Exhibits "A" & w B n e
3. WHETHER THE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT MADE A VALID
PROFER OF JUDGMENT.
On the morning of the trial, January 26,1987, the Third
Party Defendants thru their attorney, delivered to the court a
document entitled, "OFFER OF JUDGMENT", (Exhibit "C",attached).
Although it purports to be pursuant to Rule 68(b), URCP, the
offer fails in several ways to comply with the rule.
a. It was not made 10 days before trial, as required by

6
Credit Union took money which all parties involved knew belonged
to Jean Asay's employer, and used it to cover the Nelsons1 bad
checks. The Credit Union's attorney was well familiar with the
situation, and its attorney discussed the situation in Exhibit
"B®, attached;
(question by Mr. McPhie) "..what in fact happened was
that the Nelsons simply overdrafted their checking
account at the credit union and the credit union
covered their overdraft on their checking account with
their savings account until their savings account was
exhausted and the seven-hundred-something dollars that
had remained in their savings were all exhausted
through covering overdrafts on the Nelsons' checking
account..."
The Judge erred in not granting Defendants the relief
sought in their counter-claim, his prejudice is apparent in the
comments he made in the Hearing Transcript pp 30, that even
though the Nelsons were the ones who used the money which should
have paid the note in full, and the Credit Union appropriated
money out of a restricted account, to make it easy on
themselves, that he still held the Plaintiff's entitled to
Judgment against Defendants. His conclusions are illogical in
light of the facts. Defendant was in fact the victim? it was
her money which the credit union took to cover the Nelsons'
overdraft, and to charge her with the shortage only adds insult
to injury.
2. THE JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PAUL CLINT TO TESTIFY
WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
In this matter, the Plaintiff took the depositions of
Paul Clint, Jean Asay and Mr. Nelson. The deposition of Clint
was published at the trial, and Exhibit "B" contains salient
portions of the questions propounded to Mr. Clint. It clearly

5
the second hearing, after the Judgment had already been signedf
an affidavit from David A. McPhie, (Exhibit "F" attached) which
purported to separate the fees on the note action from those on
the Counterclaim. A copy of the amended Judgment is attached as
Exhibit "G".

E. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS:
1. Defendant v/as not liable to Plaintiff on the note,
and the sums appropriated by Plaintiff from Defendant's
account should have been offset against the note.
2. The Judge's refusal to allow Paul Clint to testify
was prejudicial error,
3. The Third Party Plaintiffs' Offer of Judgment was
ineffectual and did not preclude the court granting
judgment against the Third party, who really owed the
money to the Plaintiff for which Plaintiff sued
Defendant.
4. Plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees where
counsel did not apportion his time and fees between the
note, which provided for attorney fees, and defense of
the counterclaim which <<3id not.
5. Defendant is entitled to attorney fees against the
Third Party Defendants, who admitted all along that
they owed the money in contest, but delayed paying it
until after the litigation was in court.
F.

ARGUMENTS:
1. DEFENDANT WAS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF ON THE NOTE,
AND WAS ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR AMOUNTS TAKEN FROM DEFENDANT'S
ACCOUNT TO COVER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S BAD CHECKS.
The simple truth in this case, as stated by the judge
in his summation (Transcript p.29- 30, copy attached as Exhibit
"H") was that the Nelsons, who had written bad checks on their
account at the Credit Union, stood by and did nothing while the

4
employer, to cover the bounced check, (Clint deposition, p.20-21
copies of the Clint deposition pages are attached as Exhibit
,f
B").
This created a $877.03 difference between the amount
in the savings account under the Nelson's name, and the balance
due on Mrs. Asay's note. The Credit Union, rather than collect
the money from the Nelsons, whom they knew oWed it, elected to
sue Mrs. Asay on her note, because against her they could claim
attorney fees.
The morning of the trial, the Nelsons1 attorney Mr.
Katz appeared before the court, and submitted to the court a
document entitled "Offer of Judgment" (Copy attached as Exhibit
"C"). No money was paid, the sum "offered", $711.50, was less
than the amount later determined to be owed by Nelsons, and did
not include costs as required by Rule 68b. Nelsons1 attorney did
not stay for the trial. The "Offer" was not timely, and at the
end of the trial, the court awarded Judgment against the Nelsons
for the same amount as it awarded Judgment to Plaintiff and
against Defendant, $877.03, plus $2500. attorney fees, plus
costs and interest.
The Nelsons1 attorney filed an objection to the
proposed Order and Judgment, in which the undersigned joined,
insofar as it related to the granting of attorney fees to
Plaintiff.
The court held a second hearing, and after noting that
Mr. Katz correctly cited the applicable law (see Third Party
Defendants' Objection to Proposed Judgment, copy attached as
Exhibit "D"), the court acknowledged that it had erred in
granting
attorney's
fees without
requiring apportionment,
(Hearing Transcript, p32, copy attached as Exhibit "E"). The
Court erred again, in accepting, some weeks after the trial, at

3
Simultaneously the court ruled that Defendant was
entitled to the same Judgment against Third Party Defendant.
Third Party Defendant objected to the proposed Judgment, on the
grounds that there had been no apportionment of the attorney
fees and there was no written agreement for the third party to
pay attorney fees to Defendant, and to strike the award of
attorney fees altogether because Plaintiff, in his presenting of
evidence in support of his claim for fees, did not apportion the
fees as between the time spent on the promissory note suit, and
that spent on defense of the Counterclaim.
i

Defendant joined in the Objection. Upon hearing, the
Court admitted that it had erred in not apportioning the fees,
but accepted an affidavit filed at the second hearing which
purported to apportion the fees. The court amended the Judgment
to make the attorney fees $2,000. The amended judgment, was
signed March 25, 1987, defendant appealed April 14, 1987, on all
issues.
2. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: As a part of a real estate
transaction between Defendant Asay's employer, Paul Clint and
the Third Party Defendants, Nelsons, the Nelsons were required
to show that they had money in the bank for closing costs. Clint
put $5,000. in a Credit Union Savings Account in the NelsonBs
name, with an agreement that the Nelsons would pay off a $5,000.
promissory note to the Credit Union, borrowed by Jean Asay.
(Paul Clint deposition, pp.9-12; Jean Asay deposition, pp 6-8,
Asay deposition pages attached as Exhibit "A").
The Nelsons, who had a checking account thru the same
Credit Union, bounced a check (or checks), which the Credit
Union covered (without informing Asay) by simply taking the
money out of the Savings Account money belonging to Asay's

2
C. STATUTES, RULES & CAMS
1 # 78-24-1&2 UCA

DBmmrMVTTKt

2. Rule 68b, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "At any
time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him
for the money or property or to the effect specified in
his offer, with costs then accrued....11
3. B&R SUPPLY vs. BRINGHURST 28 Ut2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216
4. Utah Farm Production vs. Cox 627 P.2d 62
5. Stubbs vs. Hemmert 567 P.2d 168
6. Turtle Management vs. Haggis 645 P.2d 667.
7. 78-27-56 UCA. "In civil actions, where not otherwise
provided by statute or agreement, the court may award
reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the
court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith."
D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
1. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS &
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW:'
After a non-jury trial, the Circuit Court granted
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendant on a
$877.03 balance due on a $5,000. note. The court also awarded
Attorney fees of $2500., not apportioning fees in connection
with suit on the note, from fees incurred to defend against the
Counterclaim. The Court dismissed the Counterclaim, which was
based on defendant's contention that she had posted $5,000. cash
with the Credit Union to guarantee Third Party Defendants'
payment of the note, but that the Credit Union had, contrary to
instructions, invaded the $5,000. to cover a check overdraft on
Third Party Defendants' checking account, and that the $877.03
balance due on the note was not Defendant's fault.
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2. Whether the court erred in refusing to allow Paul
Clint to testify as to material matters dealing with the
transaction.
30 Whether the Third Party Defendant made a valid
Profer of Judgment.
4. Whether the court erred in failing to apportion
attorney fees.
5. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney fees from
Third Party Defendant on her judgment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS;
Page
A.
B.
C.
D.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION & PROCEEDINGS BELOW
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATUTES, RULES, & CASES DETERMINATIVE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE;
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings
Statement of Facts
E. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
F. ARGUMENT
1. Liability on the Note
1
2. Refusal to allow Clint to testify
3. Validity of Offer of Judgment
4. Apportionment of Attorney Fees
5. Bad Faith Attorney Fees
G. CONCLUSION

1
1
2
2
3
5
5
5
6
7
8
10
12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES;
Page
STATUTES CITED:
78-24-1 & 2 UCA
78-27-56 UCA
RULES CITED:
Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

2,
2, 1
2, 7

CASES CITED:
B & R SUPPLY vs. BRINGHURST, 28 Ut.2d 442,
503 P.2d 1216
2, 9
STUBBS VS HEMMERT, 567 P.2d 168
2, 9
TURTLE MANAGEMENT vs. HAGGIS 645 P.2d 667
2, I
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION CREDIT VS COX 627 P. 2d 62 — 2, 9

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff & Respondent
vs.
JEAN ASAY,
Defendant & Appellant
vs.
DONNA NELSON & HARPER R. NELSON,
Third Party Defendants.
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APPELLANTS BRIEF

Appeal from a Judgment from the Fifth
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department, the Honorable
LeRoy H. Griffiths, Judge
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8/11
Review of answers to interrogatires, motion,
trial date

32.00#

8/11
Preparation of final answers to interrogatories,
request for production, motion compel, affidavit,
for fees

22.00#

9/2
Dictation of notice of continuance on motion to
compel, meeting with Trujillo
10/22
Call from Trujillo, Re:
payoff

26.00#
30.00*

Nelson default, he wanted
16,00*

11/5
Call to Trujillo to quote fees and costs to date

^JLfUQa*!-'

11/7
Call to Trujillo, he had settlemen offer, rejected,
aslced for continuance said we would not agree
11/13
Preparation for trial

"18,00* ?
(||54«00*

1 2 / 1

-*

Preparation of new request for trial setting
1987

lp50,00* *

1/7
Call to Tom to notify about trail, set up
meeting day before
1/27
Conference with Tom and Mary in preparation
for t r i a l
V27
Preparation for and appearance a t t r i a l

!

18,00*
'ii7 f qp,*
^ ^ ,.,. ,.
4 H K L a 0 C * **»•
100.00#"

1/28
Dictation of judgment

90.00*

1/29
Preparation of judgment, copies, mailing

18.00*

3

2/12
Review of objections to orders by Nelsens,
reschedule instructions

90.00+

3/86
Research law in support of proposed motion

80.00+

3/86
Preparation of memorandum of points and
authorities in support of proposed motion

150.00+

* = 2,096.85
ft = 1,101.10
+ =
320.00
Total Fees = $3,517.85

DAVID A. MCPHIE, #2216
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84106
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
LDS CHURCH EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

v.

Civil No. 85CVM-06470

JEAN ASAY,

Judge Griffiths

DefendantThird Party Plaintiff,
v.
DONNA NELSON and HARPER R.
NELSON,
Third Party Defendants.
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THIS MATTER came on for trial before the Honorable Judge
L.H. Griffiths, in his courtroom located at 5025 S. State street,
Murray, Utah, at the regularly scheduled time, that being on
Tuesday, the 27th day of January, 1987, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.
The plaintiff appeared through its authorized agents, Tom
Capece and Mary Sartori, and through their attorney of record,
David A. McPhie.

The defendant Jean Asay did not appear, but was

represented by her attorneys of record, Jose Luis Trujillo and
Glen Ellis.

The third party defendants, Nelson, did not appear,

but were represented by their attorney of record, Michael A.

Katz.
The court first considered the motion of counsel for the
defendant to withdraw from the case, along with the motion filed
the previous day by proposed substitute counsel, Glen Ellis. The
court having found that the matter had previously been set for
trial

on

two

separate

occasions

and

that

the

motions

for

withdrawal of counsel and continuance were brought on the date of
trial, the court denied both motions.
Counsel for the third party defendants Nelson, did submit
both orally and in writing, an offer of judgment, which offer was
accepted by defendant through her counsel, and by the court.
Counsel for plaintiff made an opening statement, as did
counsel

for

the

defendant.

The

court

received

testimony,

proffer, of evidence and argument fro* both the plaintiff and
defendant concerning both the complaint and the counterclaim.
Subsequent to the presentation of the defendants case in chief on
her counterclaim, counsel for the plaintiff made a motion for
dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendant.

No testimony was

given in support of the defendants third-party complaint.
The

court

having

considered

the

testimony,

documents

admitted into evidence, the proffers of evidence and arguments of
both

counsel,

appearing

having

considered

therefor, did

grant

the

file,

the motion

and

good

cause

of the plaintiff,

dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant.
Further, based on the testimony, documents admitted into
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and

igood cause therefor, the court entered a judgment on behalf of
|the plaintiff as against the defendant Jean Asay, in the amounts
jof:

A.

$877.03 in principal;

B.

$272.00 in interest at the note rate from March 11th,

1985, until the date of trial;
C.

Costs of court in the amount of $194.00;

D.

Attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00;

E.

For a total judgment in the amount of $3,843.03, with

| a provision that said judgment should bear interest at the note
'rate, that being at 16.5% per annum, until paid in full.
Further, counsel for plaintiff submitted a proposed order
:which the court did sign.
Subsequently, counsel for third-party defendants, Nelson,

Ujdid file an objection to the proposed order of the plaintiff.
jJThe defendant, Jean Asay, did, through her counsel, join in the
objection to plaintiffs proposed order.
jdid

schedule

for purposes

Further, that the court

of resolving

said

disputes about

[plaintiffs proposed order, a hearing held on the 18th day of
(March, 1987, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the court.

Further,

that the plaintiff appeared through its counsel, David A. McPhie.
Defendant appeared through her counsel, Glen Ellis, and third(party defendants appeared through their counsel, Michael Katz.
Counsel for all parties made proffers of evidence and
argument to the court concerning the objections of the defendant
;ffT^r^7^?T ^^l 1 ^ 3
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defendants

to

the

proposed

order

of the

plaintiff, and the court having heard the matter fully, and
aaving considered the file, and good cause appearing therefor,
low amends its former ruling in the above captioned matter, and
nakes the following order.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff
OB awarded judgment against the defendant as follows:
A.

In the principal amount of $877.03;

B.

Interest thereon at the note rate from March 11th,

L985 until the date of trial in the amount of $272.00?
C*

Costs of court in the amount of $194.00;

E.

Attorneys fees in the amount of $2,000.00;

F.

For a total judgment in favor of the plaintiff as

against the defendant, Jean Asay, in the amount of $3,343.03. It
Ls the

further order of the court that this judgment bear

Lnterest at the note rate, that being at the rate of 16.5% per
innum, until paid in full.
It is the further order of the court that this order be
entered nunc pro tunc in place of the order previously signed,
md effective dated the 25th day of February, 1987.

DATED this 2 ^d a Yof -

/TJMAI

, 1987.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 4.5
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing judgment to the following in accordance with Rule 4.5
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